什么乱七八糟的，我也不看前面那么多了，直接说结论
Dean Takahashi的书当年对NV自己的技术没说明白，但是大方向已经很明确了
微软和NV闹掰，然后参考NGC运作模式的主要原因，表面上是NV专利的问题，但本质上是生产问题
ATI允许任天堂自己拿着芯片设计自己找晶圆厂，自己处理价格，但NV不行
不但不行，甚至还各种浑水摸鱼，发售前频率就没达到承诺，发售后该降价又不降价，都上法院走仲裁程序了
至于任天堂是不是这一下子就拥有了ATI（或者说ArtX）的全部图形专利可以随便玩了？当然不是，那种套娃协议允许甲方能做的产品是有限的

360和X1虽然用DX，但和PC上的DX略有区别，这个算是常识
比如360是DX9.0c+，多出来的是统一着色和曲面细分，但它依然不算DX10或者DX11，只是个9和10之间的过渡
X1的情况大部分人都知道了，主机配置比较固定驱动层写的薄

而老XB这块的问题是更复杂的，我早年也不知道具体情况，是高人hourousha翻了手册我才看到个大概
https://bbs.tgfcer.com/viewthrea ... &authorid=18955
有很多XB游戏可以通过DX8直接移植到PC，GF3就能跑，所以包括我在内的很多人觉得XB也就是这么回事
但实际上XB的显卡更接近GF4，无论是芯片技术还是对应的接口都有些DX8没有的功能
这也是有些XB游戏移植到PC后反而需要DX9的原因
二者的区别在于开发的时候有没有提前考虑到这点，如果考虑到了，不去用额外的功能，全用标准的DX8做，那就可以
如果追求完全榨干XB性能，那移植到PC就需要DX9

也不只是NV如此，ATI也有类似的情况
360和HD2900就有曲面细分了（虽然功能相比DX11版本有欠缺），这也不是标准的DX9和DX10提供的功能

Dean当年写的究竟是芯片还是API我现在懒得看，但前面都已经说的这么明白了，具体是哪个已经不重要了
因为有大量XB游戏不是用标准DX8写的，无论是软硬件都绕不开，至于具体是软还是硬那都无所谓，交钱就是了
XB民间模拟器初期进度神速然后马上卡住了也是这个原因，NV自有大量专利没解密
哪怕是微软自己现在也就搞定了三代Xbox的兼容性，PC的消费者用XB模拟器（准确来说其实是HyperV虚拟机）取消了，斯宾塞承认不好搞，麻烦

至于DX12U，AMD也支持这个标准，光追是NV先做的但不代表人人都得给他交专利费，只要法律上没碰专利就行，而法律文件写的是很细节的
就像FSR2.0也不是必须给DLSS交专利费，这不是“看着像”就必须交钱的
同理我也没记得NV需要给ATI的曲面细分交专利费
DX本身就是个通用标准，只要你能跑，具体用什么硬件实现，它是不管的
最极端的例子就是DX9早期，ATI是FP24，NV是FP16+32，但是都能跑3DMARK03，那就都算符合DX9标准，至于跑的好不好那另一说

[ 本帖最后由 Nemo_theCaptain 于 2022-7-12 20:51 编辑 ]

Ctrl+F了一下
Dean确实没说老黄收的专利费究竟是软件还是硬件的，他对这件事也不是很清楚
至于为什么老黄差点拿下360但最终又失之交臂，他倒是解释的很清楚
主要原因就是上面提到的，但即使老黄有这么多问题，出于兼容性微软也是愿意考虑的
直到软件团队的虚拟机心里有谱了，才敲定选择ATI
另一个事情也广为人知，虽然我上面没提——Intel是不想和NV把CPU和显卡贴在一起的

“The first time, we had a short period of time and it didn’t afford us the
opportunity to make these relationships,” Holmdahl said. “The whole intellectual
property business, sharing IP, was just in its infancy. The lesson we learned is you
want to control your destiny.” 

Holmdahl knew that the rush to get to market had forced Microsoft to
sign some contracts that it eventually came to regret. The company tried to
lean on suppliers to cut costs as much as possible, but Nvidia’s CEO, Jen-Hsun
Huang, had fought back. The battle spilled into public. Both companies sought
a resolution in an arbitration process, which was the only thing that prevented
them from going to court.

Huang wanted to redo the contract because the yields on his chips weren’t
as high as expected. Nvidia had to scale back the speed of its graphics chips to
get better yields, but the problem persisted. Huang threatened to stop shipping
chips. Microsoft objected, and the arbitrator sided with Microsoft.

The lesson inside Microsoft was clear. Holmdahl wanted more control over
the design and manufacturing of its chips. That would give him more leverage
over suppliers. This was the key for Microsoft to control the costs of the box.
From Microsoft’s point of view, Nvidia and Intel had kept too much of the control
in terms of cost-reducing their chips and determining the price changes on their
own schedule. Because they didn’t cut the costs quickly, Microsoft could not
cut the prices on the original Xbox. Yet, for the sake of compatibility, it seemed
Microsoft was stuck with those vendors. It was almost a given that old Xbox
games had to play on Xenon.



Some partners weren’t ready to go along with Microsoft’s ideas. Neither
Nvidia nor Intel liked the idea of giving ownership of the chip intellectual
property to Microsoft. They wanted to build chips. This time, the partners had to
be willing to let Microsoft run the system design. Microsoft also wanted to take
the chips and have them fabricated in a factory of its choosing. The resistance
from Nvidia and Intel wasn’t total. But it hurt their ability to stay in the running
for the contracts.

On top of the power problem, neither Intel nor Nvidia were inclined to
share their intellectual property with Microsoft. This time, Holmdahl continued
to insist that Microsoft had to own the rights to the design. It was critical to
bringing down the costs of the hardware and making money on the whole Xbox
endeavor. He wanted to be able to take the design and cost-reduce the chips on
his own schedule. That meant redesigning the chip, shrinking it so that it used
less material and was easier to fabricate. He wanted to have the right to have the
chip made in any factory so that he could play manufacturers off against each
other on pricing. And he eventually wanted to be able to combine the CPU and
the graphics chip into a single chip in order to drive costs out of the box. Those
elements were essential to making money on Xenon.

“That’s not our traditional way of doing business,” said Don MacDonald, an
Intel executive.

Intel typically owned its own designs, redesigned its chips on its own
schedule, and made them in its own captive factories. Nvidia did the same, with
the exception of making its chips at either IBM’s factories or those belonging to
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Neither Intel and Nvidia would ever
trust each other enough to share their chip designs with each so they could be
merged into a single chip. Negotiations with those vendors hit a brick wall.

To Nick Baker and Jeff Andrews, that was OK. They saw that ATI was starting
to take the lead in PC graphics chips. ATI was a $2 billion company with 3,000
employees. Its Radeon 9700 chip that came out in August, 2002, was retaking the
high-end of the graphics chip market for the first time ever for ATI.

Bob Feldstein, vice president of engineering at ATI, gathered a dozen ATI
veterans, including Clay Taylor and Steve Narayan, to contemplate graphics for a
game box. They knew that Microsoft wanted to highlight high-definition gaming
and launch in the fall of 2005 at the price of a traditional video game console,
about $300. They also knew that Microsoft wanted to own the design that ATI
would create and fabricate it in a factory of its choosing. While that was a tough
hurdle for Nvidia, ATI’s Santa Clara team had done such a deal with Nintendo
already. It received a fee for the engineering work and a royalty on each console
sold. It wasn’t as much money as if ATI had made the chip for Nintendo, but it
was money that floated to the bottom line.

Nvidia almost stole the graphics chip deal away from ATI Technologies
in July, 2003. Jen-Hsun Huang, the CEO of Nvidia, was a shrewd
negotiator. He stayed in the running for the graphics chip contract, in
spite of the ill will over the first Xbox. One of the things Huang could
offer was a discount on the current Xbox chips. He also noted how
easy it would be to make the system backward compatible with the old
system, and how Microsoft would likely have to pay a royalty to Nvidia
if it intended on making old Xbox games run on the new Xbox, even if
Nvidia’s chip wasn’t in the new one. Was Nvidia just a stalking horse?

[ 本帖最后由 Nemo_theCaptain 于 2022-7-12 18:42 编辑 ]